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Abstract:  Construction contract auctions are characterised by (1) a heavy emphasis on the 
lowest bid as that is which usually determines the winner of the auction, (2) anticipated high 
outliers due to the presence of uncompetitive bids, (3) very small samples, and (4) uncertainty of 
the appropriate underlying density function model of the bids.  This paper describes a graphical 
method for simultaneously identifying outliers and density function by first removing candidate 
(high) outliers and then examining the goodness-of-fit of the resulting reduced samples by 
comparing the reduced sample predictability (by the expected value of the lowest order statistic) 
of the lowest bid with that of the equivalent predictability by Monte Carlo simulations of one of 
the common density functions.  When applied to a set of 1073 auctions, the results indicate the 
appropriateness of censored and reduced sample lognormal models for a wide range of cut-off 
values.  These are compared with cut-off values used in practice and to identify potential 
improvements. 
 
Keywords: Construction, contract, auctions, outliers, goodness-of-fit, censored samples, small 
samples. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
An overwhelming majority of contracts for construction work are let by sealed bid auctions, for 
which the criterion of award is the lowest bid (Merna and Smith, 1990).  Increasingly, the 
participants of construction contract auctions (tenderers), are chosen by the auctioneer (client, 
owner, principal, consultant) in advance of the auction in order to restrict those tendering bids to 
the ones favoured by the auctioneer because of their known or conjectured ability to perform the 
work satisfactorily, as well as minimising the abortive tendering costs of those not so favoured.  
Preselection of tenderers in this way is fine when all the tenderers are keen to obtain the work 
and tender competitive bids.  However, there are a variety of reasons (e.g. full order books, the 
strength of the competition, low projected profit levels, cost of bidding and short period allowed 
for bid preparation) why tenderers sometimes would prefer not to bid for a particular contract.  
Rather than abstain in such situations, invited tenderers often bid anyway in order to stay in 
favour with the auctioneer.  By their very nature, such bids are not intended to be competitive.  
They must also be inexpensive to produce and, to achieve their purpose, be undetectable by the 
auctioneer. 
 
One means of achieving this is through what is known as ‘cover’ pricing, by which a 
competitor’s bona fide bid is used with the addition of a few percent to ensure 
uncompetitiveness.  In some countries, cover pricing per se is illegal as it necessarily involves 
the pre-auction collusion of two of the tenderers.  In most other countries, it is at least regarded 
as unethical.  The Institute of Quantity Surveyors (IQS) Sussex Branch (1979), however, in an 
opinion survey involving “a few hundred individuals earning their living by preparing bills of 
quantities, estimates, managing contracts and business”, found that cover prices are taken 
notwithstanding attempts to prevent the practice, the responses showing “a marked unanimity”.  
Also, Daniels (1978), in describing the work of the UK Builders’ Conference, revealed that 
tenderers admitted to the use of cover prices.  Indeed, discussions at a 1979 conference entitled 
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“Estimating, the Way Ahead’, organised by the Building Trades Journal, openly admitted the 
practice of taking cover prices, discussing alternative methods of acquiring such prices. 
 
Another possible means of uncompetitive bidding, reported by Moyles (1973), is for tenderers to 
give detailed attention to desirable contracts only, the remaining bids being prepared in a more 
approximate manner with a risk allowance to cover unforeseen circumstances and for the less 
accurate method of estimating - a method seemingly fraught with the possibility of either 
winning the auction with an underestimated cost or bidding so high as to be detectable by the 
auctioneer. 
 
Whichever method is used, the result is likely to be a suboptimal competition for the auctioneer, 
whose ignorance of the uncompetitive nature of the bid precludes the possibility of selecting a 
replacement tenderer.  It is clearly in the auctioneer’s interest, therefore, to be able to identify 
uncompetitive bids for remedial action to be instigated.  One arbitrary approach to this is the 
Hong Kong Government’s criterion by which all bids greater than 25% of the lowest bid are 
deemed uncompetitive and the relevant tenderers thus made ineligible for the next few auctions. 
 
The presence of uncompetitive bids is also a complicating factor in competitor analysis and 
strategic bidding, where statistical models of bids are required.  Here the object is to remove the 
uncompetitive bids prior to modelling.  The methods used by researchers to do this have been 
inconsistent and largely arbitrary.  Southwell (1971), in attempting to model construction 
contract auction bids, simply excludes uncompetitive bids by pure intuition without further 
comment.  Franks (1970), in comparing the variability of students’ price forecasts with bids 
obtained for several ‘live’ construction contract auctions, excludes the upper 20 percent of bids 
as being “probably uncompetitive”.  Morrison and Stevens (1980), on the other hand, have 
considered excluding the highest two bids for each auction, while Whittaker’s (1970) analysis of 
153 UK construction contract auctions excluded all bids exceeding the average bid by a factor of 
6. 
 
In contrast with this, Pim (1974), along with the majority of bidding strategists (e.g. Friedman, 
1956; Gates, 1967; Carr, 1982; Skitmore and Pemberton, 1994), does not advocate rejecting bids 
that look ‘wrong’, although he suggests excluding bids his own firm know to be wrong because 
of arithmetical of judgement errors.  In another study, Johnston (1978), far from eliminating 
suspect bids, considered them to be of great importance and, in examining the degree of 
skewness, suggested a possible correlation with industry workload – a conclusion, incidentally, 
not supported by Skitmore’s (1981) later similar study. 
 
The least arbitrary of approaches to date is McCaffer’s (1976) study of Belgian construction 
contract auction data and in which outliers were identified, in the form of unexpectedly long 
tails, as a result of applying the Anderson-Darling test for distribution shape.  Since his data 
appeared to have been drawn from a general normal distribution, McCaffer recommended the 
use of Grubbs' (1950) test.  The use of this test, however, has subsequently been criticised as 
inappropriate in this case, as the sample sizes are too small and that the presence of outliers is 
more likely to be indicative of a wrongly assumed shape parameter than uncompetitive bids 
(Skitmore, 1981). 
 
In short then, the analysts of the distribution of construction contract auction bids fall into two 
camps – those who prefer uncompetitive bids to be included in their models and those who wish 
to exclude them from their models, by far the larger of which is the former group.  What is 
undisputed is that uncompetitive bids DO exist.  The cause of the differences between the two 
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groups is, of course, is not so much one of philosophy, but of the practical difficulties in 
identifying uncompetitive bids that are, by their very nature, designed to look competitive (to 
avoid detection by the auctioneer) even though they are not, and the lack of objective tests to 
judge the performance of detection methods (data identifying which bids are ACTUALLY 
deliberately uncompetitive is extremely scarce due to the associated legal and ethical issues 
involved). 
 
Skitmore et al’s (1999) recent analysis of bid-spread (i.e. the difference between lowest and 
second lowest bid values) seems to suggest a way forward.  In analysing seven construction 
contract auction datasets gathered from around the world they found that by far the best 
predictor variable of the percentage difference between the lowest and second lowest bid (which 
they term % bid-spread) was the percentage difference between the expected value of the lowest 
order statistic and expected value of the second lowest order statistic (which they term, %λ) of 
the lognormal distribution.  The first point of interest in this is that the %λ variable, being 
derived from the properties of a random variable, supports (or at least does not refute) the 
underlying statistical (random) nature of the data.  The second point is that, when compared to 
the %λ equivalent for the uniform distribution, the lognormal model is the better predictor – 
suggesting the lognormal model to be a more appropriate model for the data.  The final aspect of 
the work was to show that %λ generally overpredicts % bid-spread, suggesting that either a 
better model than lognormal distribution needs to be found or that the sample variance used to 
calculate the order statistics is overestimating the true variance.  If the latter is true, then the most 
likely source of such systematic overestimating is that of high outliers. 
 
This, then, suggests a method for the indirect identification of high outliers by a process of 
elimination, ie. by systematically removing the highest, second highest, etc bids, until the % bid-
spread ceases to be overpredicted.  In fact, it provides the opportunity to test an entire range of 
high-outlier identification strategies, including those already mentioned in the literature.  Of 
course, it is equally valid to use the expected value of the lowest order statistic to predict the 
actual value of the lowest bid as it is to use %λ to predict % bid-spread, and the distribution of 
the error of this prediction provides more information than the mere correlation coefficient as 
used by Skitmore et al.  The work described in this paper reflects this. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH OUTLIERS 
 
Background 
 
Tietjen (1986) has summarised the major considerations involved in outlier analysis and 
identification.  These involve the distinction between discordant observations, which appear 
surprising or discrepant to the investigator, and contaminant observations, which do not come 
from the target population.  To distinguish between the two types of outliers hinges on the model 
of the data used which, in turn, is said to depend on the investigators knowledge of data 
generating process.  In some cases, the data may be genuinely highly skewed; in other cases the 
cases arise from a mixture of distributions.  Another issue is the purpose for which outliers are 
sought.  As Tietjen notes, if all that is intended is an accurate estimate of the mean and variance 
of the population, “it may be more dangerous to do nothing” (p496) quoting Anscombe’s (1960) 
comment that “one sufficiently erroneous reading can wreck the whole of a statistical analysis”.  
Another issue concerns the treatment of outliers and whether they are to be omitted or 
accommodated in some way.  A further issue is whether we are interested in outliers only on the 
high side or on the low side.  Finally, is the question of whether we are concerned with single or 
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multiple outliers, as the analysis and identification of multiple outliers is very much more 
complicated, relying very much on the subjective estimate, k, of the number of outliers, involved 
by “looking at the data” (p504) there being “no objective way of deciding upon a value of k” 
(p506) (source emphasis). 
 
For construction contract auctions, the uncontested view is that uncompetitive bids do occur and 
that these are invariably produced by a different mechanism than competitive bids.  It is clear, 
therefore that we are concerned with contaminant observations.  The data generating process is 
more problematic.  The text book description of the compilation of competitive bids is that of 
the summation of the product of unit quantity and unit cost components followed by the 
application of a strategic mark-up multiplier in the form of a percentage addition.  Researchers 
have sometimes treated the unit cost component as a normally distributed (e.g. Ranasinghe, 
1994) but with little regard to the nature of the unit quantities and mark-up values.  Most 
commonly, the total bid price for each tenderer has been treated as a random variable from some 
well-known density function such as uniform (e.g. Cauwelaert and Heynig, 1978; Fine and 
Hackemar, 1970; Grinyer and Whittaker, 1973; Whittaker, 1970), normal (Cauwelaert and 
Heynig, 1978; McCaffer, 1976; Mitchell, 1977; Morrison and Stevens, 1980; Skitmore 1986), 
lognormal (Brown, 1966; Klein, 1976; Skitmore, 1986; Weverbergh, 1982); gamma (Friedman, 
1956), Weibull (Oren and Rothkopf, 1975) or just “positively skewed” (Beeston, 1974; 
McCaffer and Pettitt, 1976; Park, 1966).  Often, the assumption of iid is made for each tenderer 
and with coefficients of variation in most cases ranging between 5 and 8.5%. 
 
The purposes of the analysis and identification of construction contract auction outliers is 
essentially to provide a better, or at least alternative models for the identification of 
uncompetitive bids and bidders for possibly minimising their frequency, improved auctioneers 
and tenderers analysis and prediction of competitive behaviour and analysis and prediction of 
changing distribution parameters, particularly in response to market conditions (after Johnston, 
1978; Skitmore, 1981; Rowlinson and Raftery, 1997) and construction contract characteristics 
(after Skitmore , 1981).  Once identified, the aim is therefore to omit the outliers and treat the 
reduced sample either as a new or censored sample. 
 
Although there is interest in low outliers, mainly as a means of identifying unreasonable, or 
suicidally low bids (e.g., Cauweleart and Heynig, 1978; Drew and Skitmore, 1993), the purpose 
at this point is to concentrate exclusively on high outliers for the reasons described above.  As 
such, therefore, this work can be regarded as a special case, with the analysis and identification 
of high AND low outliers being in prospect for future research.  There is also no reason to 
assume the existence of only one high outlier for each auction - the user of the previous arbitrary 
high outlier criteria used in the field suggesting that multiple outliers to be anticipated. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
In the analysis of construction contract auctions, the value of the lowest bid assumes supreme 
importance.  In the vast majority of cases, it is the lowest bid that determines not only the 
identity of the winning tenderer but also the legally binding value of the contract (Merna and 
Smith, 1990).  In addition, it is the prediction of the value of the lowest bid that is the ultimate 
purpose of most bidding models.  It is natural, therefore, to judge the adequacy of a bidding 
model by its ability to accurately predict the value of the lowest bid.  In recent research by 
Skitmore et al (1999), involving the analysis of seven sets of construction contract auction data 
from around the world, the percentage difference between the expected value of the lowest order 
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statistic and the expected value of the second lowest order statistic, termed %λ, was found to be 
easily the best predictor of the percentage difference between the actual lowest and second 
lowest bid, termed %bid-spread.  Table 1 provides some relevant details of this analysis and 
summary statistics of six of the datasets involved.  Each data set comprised the values of all the 
bids entered for each contract auction, updated to the first quarter 1980 sterling equivalent by the 
relevant price indexes and exchange rate series’.  Table 2 summarises Skitmore et al’s results for 
accuracy achieved, in terms of mean and standard deviation of errors recorded in predicting the 
%bid-spread by this means together with the accuracy achieved in predicting the lowest bid (by 
the expected value of the lowest lognormal order statistic) and second lowest bid alone (by the 
expected value of the second lowest lognormal order statistic). 
 
 
Data 
set 
Source Type Period No of 
auctions 
Average 
no. bidders 
Average 
lowbid 
Average 
Std Devn 
Average 
cv 
1 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1981-2     51 6.24 1.57m   82k   5.52 
2 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1976-7   373 5.13 0.81m   47k   6.36 
3 Brown (1986) USA Govt agency building 
contracts 
1976-84     64 6.73 1.41m 122k 19.14 
4 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD contracts 1972-82   152 8.65 1.51m 103k   6.98 
5 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD specialist 
contracts 
1972-82   161 6.27 0.21m   29k 16.21 
6 Skitmore (1981) UK building contracts 1969-78   272 6.03 0.81m   48k   6.03 
All    1073 6.18 0.89m   59k   8.56 
Table 1: Data sets 
 
 
 
Dataset %bid-spread 
prediction 
Lowest bid prediction Second lowest bid 
prediction 
 mean Standard 
deviation 
mean Standard 
deviation 
mean Standard 
deviation 
1  1.086  3.023 -0.562 2.002  0.487 1.649 
2 -0.860  5.372  0.177 2.154 -0.467 2.876 
3  4.516 13.088 -3.497 9.070 -0.291 4.688 
4 1.002  3.388 -1.050 2.853 -0.090 2.005 
5  0.667 11.865 -0.363 5.191  0.431 6.693 
6 -0.316  4.383  0.252 2.190  0.034 2.149 
All  0.177  7.033 -0.307 3.703 -0.096 3.578 
Table 2: Accuracy of the expected value of lognormal order statistics 
 
As Table 2 shows, the %bid-spread is overestimated in most cases, the reason seemingly 
because the lowest bid is underestimated.  There are several possible explanations for this.  One 
is that the wrong distribution function was used.  Another is that the bids have no statistical 
basis.  Yet another is that the presence of high outliers is distorting the variance estimates needed 
to calculate the expected value of the lowest order statistic.  The second of these explanations is 
dismissed by Skitmore et al, who argue that if the best predictions come from the expected value 
of the order statistics then, as these are derived from the properties of statistical distributions, it is 
likely that the bids also are from a statistical distribution.  The first possibility is also partly 
covered by Skitmore et al who demonstrate that the same analysis under the assumption of a 
uniform distribution produces inferior predictions, leaving the presence of outliers the most 
likely explanation1. 
                                                 
1 There is, of course, a fourth possibility and that is that the actual lowest bid is systematically abnormally high.  If 
this were true, it would have much to say about the perspicacity of construction contract tenderers, who would no 
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The final issue to resolve is the outlier identification strategies to test.  Clearly, the arbitrary 
strategies described above that were used in previous work with construction contract auction 
data are candidates.  These, in fact, reduce to special cases of four types of general strategies: (1) 
highest k bids, (2) highest x1% bids, (3) bids x2% higher than the average bid and (4) bids higher 
than x3% of the lowest bid. 
 
As far as the general statistical literature is concerned, it has been pointed out that there is a long 
history associated with the identification of a single outlier (Beckham and Cook, 1983, referred 
to in Tietjen).  For cases where multiple outliers are anticipated, Tietjen and Moore (1972) have 
produced a table of critical values for testing the hypothesis that there are up to k outliers, where 
k=10, present in a sample.  The test is however, based on the assumption that k is known.  In 
ordinary circumstances, k is not known.  Several methods have been suggested for estimating k, 
but all have their weaknesses.  Rosner (1975) has overcome some of the problems involved but 
still relies on k to be decided subjectively by visual inspection of the data – a clearly impossible 
undertaking with a database of 1073 auctions. 
 
 
Summary of the method 
 
1. The outlier identification strategies to be tested comprise the four types of general 
strategies and two others considered to be appropriate: (1) highest k bids, (2) highest n-m 
bids (where n is the number of bids in the auction), (3) bids higher than the average bid 
plus x1 times the standard deviation, (4) bids x2 times higher than the mean bid, (5) bids 
higher than x3 times the lowest bid, and (6) highest x4% bids,. 
2. Outlier accommodation is by (1) reduced samples and (2) censored samples. 
3. The base (deoutliered) distributions to be tested comprise the uniform, normal, 
lognormal, gamma and weibull distributions. 
4. The test statistics are the summary statistics (mean and variance) of the difference 
between the expected value of the lowest order statistic (for each distribution in 3. 
above) for each auction and the lowest actual bid recorded for that auction once the 
suspected outliers are identified (by each strategy in 1. above) and accommodated (by 
each method in 2. above). 
5. The datasets used are those of Skitmore et al (1999).  Because of the amount of work 
involved, it was not possible to carry out all the tests on each individual dataset.  The 
method used was to carry out the tests on the pooled data first, with the intention of 
retesting each of the 6 datasets in turn later. 
6. The results were tested for significance by inspecting scatter plots produced by Monte 
Carlo simulation.  As is usual in goodness-of-fit tests in general, the term significance is 
used to denote that an observation is, or set of observations are, likely to be as assumed 
(D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986:2). Here, significance was taken to have occurred when 
the actual mean-variance coordinate fell within the eliptic approximately defining the 95 
percentile boundary of the simulated mean-variance coordinates. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
doubt be very pleased with the achievement.  The best that can be said right now on this is that it seems to be a 
highly unlikely prospect.  However, a later analysis of possible low outliers should help to resolve the point. 
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Gamma, Weibull, Uniform and Normal distributions 
 
It was not possible to test the gamma model due to difficulties in simulating the high bid values 
involved.  Insurmountable difficulties were also encountered in estimating the Weibull 
parameters due to the small sample sizes involved.  The uniform, log uniform and normal 
distributions were fitted to the data but no significant results were obtained. 
 
 
Lognormal distribution 
 
Fig 1 shows the results obtained for the outlier identification strategy 1 under the lognormal 
assumption.  This shows the mean and standard deviation of the ‘Actual’ prediction errors, ie. 
difference between the expected value of the lowest order statistic and the actual lowest bid for 
each auction, as each of the k=0(1)11 highest bids are removed.  For example, the mean and 
standard deviation of the errors are –2878.68 and 43761.50 respectively when none of the bids 
are removed (k=0).  After removing the highest bid in each auction (k=1) the mean and standard 
deviation changes to 4171.58 and 27175.59 respectively.  By the time the 11 highest bids are 
removed, the mean and standard deviation have reduced to 3144.13 and 8654.14 respectively.  
100 censored sample Monte Carlo simulations of the data were then made, by randomly 
generated values from lognormal distributions for each auction with parameters estimated from 
the full-sample, n, raw data, and repeating the process as above, ie. the k highest simulated bid 
were removed and the expected value of the lowest order statistic computed from the n-k bids 
remaining.  The averages of the means and standard deviations thus obtained are shown in Fig 1 
as ‘simulation mean (censored samples)’.  100 reduced sample simulations were also carried 
out.  This was done by randomly generated values from lognormal distributions for each n-k-size 
auction with parameters estimated from the n-k raw data.  The averages of the means and 
standard deviations thus obtained are shown as ‘simulation mean (reduced samples)’.  The 
distribution of the individual simulated points was then inspected visually to judge the 
confidence with which the ‘actual’ points could be ascribed to be from censored or reduced 
samples.  As a result, the points at k=1,2,…,11 were adjudged to be from censored samples.  
None of the points was considered to be from reduced samples. 
 
Figs 2-6 show the results for strategies 2-6 respectively.  The significant results obtained in this 
way are summarised in Table 3 together with the minimum number of outliers identified by each 
strategy. 
 
Method Censored samples Reduced samples 
 Range Minimum no. of 
outliers 
Range Minimum no. of 
outliers 
1 k≥1 1073 None  
2 4≥m 3566 5≥m≥7 735 
3 1.5≥x1 440 1.9≥x1≥1.6 131 
4 1.08≥x2 774 x2=1.1 573 
5 1.10≥x3 2388 1.26≥x3≥1.14 682 
6 x4≥10 1249 None  
 
Table 3: Significant results 
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Discussion 
 
It is obvious that the cut-off point above which bids are to be regarded as outliers is that value of 
the manipulated variable (k in method, m in method 2, x1 in method 3, x2 in method 4, x3 in 
method 5 and x4 in method 6) that simultaneously produces a significant result, in terms of a 
lognormal distribution, and a minimum number of outliers.  What are shown as censored sample 
inequalities in Table 3 can therefore be regarded as the optimal cut-off points for each method.  
Similarly, the inequalities for the method 2, 3,and 5 reduced samples indicate their respective 
optimal cut-off points to be m=7, x1=1.9 and x3=1.26. 
 
It is interesting to note that all the censored sample results are significant at all the points below 
their cut-off levels, e.g., method 1 censored sample is significant at k=1 and all other values of k 
above 1.  In other words, once the minimum number of outliers has been found which makes the 
behaviour of the remaining observations accord with a censored lognormal sample, removing 
further outliers also produces further censored lognormal samples. This is, of course, to be 
expected, as an obvious property of a censored ξ distribution is that it will remain a censored ξ 
distribution when further censored.  It is clear then that this property of invariance under 
repeated censoring could be utilised in goodness-of fit testing for uncensored or censored ξ 
distributions, as it is necessary and sufficient condition for their existence.  This makes the 
empirical result here of especial importance as, as it shows that not only is the censored 
lognormal assumption not to be violated in terms of the predictability of the lowest sample value 
by the expected value of the lowest order statistic (which is fully specified by the mean, variance 
and number of observations in the sample) at the cut-off point but also that the distribution of all 
the remaining sample values themselves are coincident with the censored lognormal assumption 
(in fact it is just on this issue that the uniform, loguniform and normal models proved to be 
inappropriate). 
 
As far as the reduced sample results are concerned, perhaps the most notable feature is that the 
significant cut-off values are bounded on both sides, indicating conclusively that the lower 
sample values do not form their own lognormal distribution.  In the absence of any previous 
work in this, it is hard to know whether this is a surprise or not.  Certainly, that the sequential 
removal of higher bids (method 1) does not result in a significant lognormal reduced sample is a 
surprise to the author.  Method 2, however, which indicates that reducing the number of bids to 
the 5, 6 and 7 lowest each results in a significant lognormal distribution, seems intuitively 
reasonable judging by the anecdotal evidence of construction contractors being unwilling to bid 
seriously when more the 5 or 6 other bidders are involved.  Another aspect of the reduced 
sample results is the relatively small number of outliers identified.  With over 1000 auctions 
analysed, the results generally indicate less than one outlier per auction – quite a lot less than 
conventional expectations. 
 
In comparison with the four practices identified above, none are justified in terms of censored 
AND reduced samples.  Franks (x4=20%) and Morrison & Stevens (k=2) methods both result in 
lognormal censored samples but not lognormal reduced samples, Hong Kong Government 
(x3=1.25) results in lognormal reduced samples but not lognormal censored samples, and 
Whittaker (x2=6) results in neither censored or reduced lognormal samples.  Table 4 shows the 
number of outliers that each of these methods would have identified.  Comparison with Table 3 
suggests that Franks could equally have applied x4=10% to give 1249 outliers and Morrison and 
Steven could have applied k=1 to give 1073 outliers using the censored sample rationale.  
Similarly the Hong Kong Government could have applied x3=1.26 to give 682 outliers using the 
reduced sample rationale (or x3=1.1 to give 2388 outliers by the censored rationale).  Whittaker’s 
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method would have produced 774 outliers (x2=1.08) with the censored sample rationale and 573 
outliers (x2=1.1) with the reduced sample rationale. 
 
Source Method Cut-off Outliers 
Franks 6 x4=20% 1503 
Morrison & Stevens 1 k=2 1948 
Whittaker 4 x2=6    0 
Hong Kong Government 5 x3=1.25  725 
Table 4: Results of practices 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Construction contract auctions are characterised by (1) a heavy emphasis on the lowest bid as 
that usually determines the winner of the auction, (2) anticipated high outliers due to the 
presence of uncompetitive bids, (3) very small samples (average of between 5 and 9 bids per 
auction). 
 
The nature of construction contract auctions is such that high outliers are anticipated on most 
occasions and their identification and accommodation is of both theoretical and practical 
interest.  The absence of any theory which predicts the true underlying density function, 
precludes any simple treatment – the type of function being an empirical issue in its own right.  
In addition, that there are small sample sizes involved means the analysis has to be concerned 
with behaviour of multiple, rather than single, samples.  Furthermore, the heavy emphasis on the 
lowest bid in auctions of this kind suggests that a goodness-of-fit test for function type be based 
on the distribution of the lowest order statistics of the function type.  The approach adopted, 
therefore, was to attempt to simultaneously identify outliers and function type by first removing 
candidate (high) outliers and then examining the goodness-of-fit of the resulting reduced 
samples by comparing the reduced sample predictability of the lowest bid with that of Monte 
Carlo simulations of one of the common density functions, for a large set of small size auctions. 
 
Also to be resolved is whether the outliers are to be regarded as contaminant (i.e. not coming 
from the target population) or discordant (ie. coming from the same population but inflated and 
distorted in some way.  In practice, the distinction is not particularly useful, as the intention is to 
penalise the source of the outliers on the grounds of (intended or even unintended) 
uncompetitive behaviour.  From analysis point of view, however, the distinction is necessary as 
contaminants involve the analysis of reduced samples and the discordants involve the analysis of 
censored samples – an aspect crucially affecting the way the Monte Carlo simulation is 
conducted. 
 
A further issue is that, with multiple small size auctions, it is necessary for the proposition of 
candidate outliers to be made strategically by formulae, as visual inspection of many auctions 
would be virtually impossible.  Four of these strategies were found in the domain literature, with 
two obvious extra alternatives added. 
 
Applying the analysis to six sets of construction contract auction data gathered from around the 
world, suitable adjusted for location (by exchange rates) and time (by tender price indices), and 
pooled under the assumption of homogeneity, several likely density functions were quickly 
eliminated.  The weibull model founded due to difficulties in parameter estimation.  The gamma 
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model was also abandoned due to difficulties encountered in simulation.  The uniform, 
loguniform and normal models failed, mainly due to their inability to withstand repeated 
censoring tests.  The lognormal model, in the words of a previous author (Weverbergh, 1982), 
seems to doing not too badly, at least as a first approximation.  Several significant results have 
been obtained for the various strategies tested.  These have been compared with specific 
practices/recommendations in the domain literature (Table 4) and some improvements have 
been identified for censored/reduced sample rationales. 
 
It has not been possible, however, to decide conclusively on the best outlier identification 
strategy, this research providing support for a wide range of methods (Table 3).  Neither has it 
been possible at this stage to test the assumption of homogeneity of datasets.  In addition, the 
clear distinction made here between censored and reduced sample models is likely to be 
oversimplistic - a combined censored/reduced sample approach being needed, where the original 
samples are progressively reduced by removing candidate outliers, each reduced sample being 
then further reduced and tested as a censored sample.  To do this, and test interdataset 
homogeneity, is currently beyond the resources available – a statistical means being needed 
(instead of the current visual method) for checking the lowest value predictions against the 
simulated predictions 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Fig Caption 
 
1 Highest k bids omitted (k values shown) 
2 Highest n-m bids omitted (m values shown) 
3 Bids over x1 times standard deviation omitted (x1 values shown) 
4 Bids over x2 time mean omitted (x2 values shown) 
5 Bids over x3 times lowest bid omitted (x3 values shown) 
6 Highest x4% bids omitted (x4 values shown) 
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